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Casenotes and Comments
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND-UNION
TRUST COMPANY V. ROSENBURG1
The owners of fee simple property executed a first mortgage to Rosenburg, et al., plaintiffs in this suit, containing
the following covenant: "It is covenanted that until default . . . the said mortgagors, their heirs, successors or
assigns2 shall have possession of the property upon paying
in the meantime all taxes . .. which taxes . . . the said
mortgagors covenant to pay when legally due." Subsequently the said mortgagors executed a second mortgage
to the Union Trust Company, defendant in this suit. In
1932 the defendant acquired the equity of redemption of the
said mortgagors by foreclosure of this second mortgage,
and immediately entered into possession. In 1933 default
was made in the payment of interest under the first mortgage, and a verbal agreement was entered into between the
plaintiffs, holders of the first mortgage, and the defendant,
under which the defendant was permitted to retain possession of the premises, collect the rents, pay all expenses
including taxes, and pay whatever surplus remained to the
plaintiffs as interest. Pursuant to this agreement the defendant remained in possession of the premises and collected all rents and profits until foreclosure by plaintiffs
of their mortgage on February 16, 1935. During the time
that this verbal agreement was in effect, the defendant
failed to pay the taxes for the years of 1934 and 1935. Under an agreed statement of facts, it is shown that between
1932, when defendant took possession, and February 16,
1935, when plaintiffs' foreclosed their mortgage, the disbursements by defendant for expenses, taxes, and interest
exceeded the income to the extent of over $3,000, although
during the fiscal year of 1934 the income exceeded the disbursements by almost $1,300, no taxes and interest being
paid during that year. The plaintiffs have paid the taxes
for the years 1934 and 1935, totalling over $1,800, and have
brought this suit in equity for reimbursement, on the theory
that defendant, as an assignee of the equity of redemption
during the time at which these taxes became due, is liable
on the covenant to pay them when "legally due". The
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defendant's defense is based upon two contentions: (1)
That under the verbal agreement whereby defendant retained possession after default in 1933, the plaintiffs are
estopped from enforcing this covenant to pay the taxes
as against defendant. (2) That this covenant is a personal
covenant and not a covenant running with the land because :
(a) the "assigns" of the covenantors are not expressly
designated and (b) affirmative burdens of covenants running with the land will only run in the cases of leasehold
estates and not in the case of fee simple property. The
trial court held for the plaintiffs and on appeal held, affirmed.
The Court devoted the major part of its opinion to the
discussion of this second contention and reached the conclusion that the burden of this covenant did attach and run
with the equity of redemption, originally vested in the
mortgagors and subsequently involuntarily assigned to the
defendant by its foreclosure of the second mortgage. Thus
the equity of redemption, to which was attached the burden
of this covenant, rested in defendant until February 16,
1935. The Court found that the taxes for 1934 and 1935
became "legally due" upon January first of each year, and
thus the failure of defendant to pay them on those dates
constituted a breach by defendant of the burden of this
covenant.
As free alienability of estates in real property developed
in England, a need arose for a device whereby subsequent
owners of these estates could be held contractually liable
for the performance or nonperformance of acts affecting
the use and enjoyment of these estates. The existing concepts of profits and easements were insufficient to meet this
need. These are incorporeal interests in the land itself,
but in no way impose any contractual obligations upon the
subsequent owners of the land. The owner of servient land
subject to an easement or profit is under no contractual obligations to the dominent owner. True, his estate in the
land is restricted to the extent of this easement or profit,
but the servient land owner is in no manner contractually
obligated to perform any act. Thus easements and profits
must be limited to: (a) those which give to the dominent
owner a right to a use or enjoyment of the servient land
concurrently with the servient owner, or (b) those in which
the use or enjoyment of the servient land by the servient
landowner is restricted. But in neither is the servient
landowner contractually obligated. Thus easements and
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profits can impose no affirmative duties, contractual or
otherwise, upon the servient land.'
This need could only be satisfied by developing the concept of a real contract, that is, a contract which was not
only personal to the contracting parties, but which also
would attach to the land and run with the land and bind and
benefit subsequent assignees of the land. The first early
English cases, developing this doctrine of real contracts,
were cases involving covenants between landlords and
tenants, relating to the use and enjoyment of the leased
land. These early cases, principally Spencers' case' laid
down three requirements for a covenant to run with the
land: (1) "privity of estate" must exist between the
covenantor and convenantee, (2) the benefit and burden of
the covenant must "touch and concern" the respective
estates of the covenantee and covenantor, and (3) if the
covenant relates to a thing not in esse then the covenant
can only run if the "assigns" are expressly designated.
With reference to the first requirement of privity of estate, no difficulty arises in the leasehold estate cases, since
there exists between the lessor and lessee a continuing relationship of tenure. Each owns an estate in the same tract
of land, the lessee's being possessory and the lessor's reversionary. Because of this tenure relationship, there can
be said to exist a continuing privity of estate between the
lessor and lessee. Therefore if the lessee assigns his possessory estate, and the lessor assigns the reversion, there
still exists between these assignees a tenure relationship.
Thus clearly privity of estate exists between two assignees,5
although they have at no time contracted with each other.
The privity of contract created by the covenants in the
lease exists only between the original lessor and original
lessee. But the privity of estate arising from the tenure
relationship has passed from the original lessor and lessee
to these assignees. Thus contractual liability upon the
covenants in the lease exists between these assignees so
long as the privity of estate continues to exist between them.
I In England and in a few American states a "spurious" easement to
maintain a fence has been recognized. Bonson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175
(1871).
5 Coke 16a (1583).
Prior to the Statute of 32 Henry VIII, Ch. 34 covenants could only run
with the lessee's possessory estate and not with the lessor's reversion. This
Statute made It possible for covenants to run with the reversion either
as to the benefit or burden. This Statute Is part of the common law of
Maryland, I Alexander's British Statutes 835.
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When the practice of inserting covenants in conveyances
in fee developed, considerable difficulty was experienced by
the courts in applying this concept of privity of estate to
such conveyances in fee. Here we do not have a continuing
tenure relationship arising from the concurrent existence
of estates in the same tract of land, but we have, at the
most, merely an instantaneous privity of estate existing
momentarily on the execution and delivery of the deed. In
other words the privity of estate is not a continuing one
arising from a tenure relationship, but an instantaneous
one existing at the moment of the transfer of the estate from
the grantor to the grantee.
The courts were then presented by the problem can such
a privity of estate suffice to create covenants running with
the land? Two states held no, placing the doctrine of covenants running with the land upon the'existence of a continuing privity of estate created by tenure.' The majority
reached the conclusion that the existence of this instantaneous privity of estate between grantor and grantee, existing at the execution and delivery of the deed, is a sufficient foundation upon which covenants running with the
land can be created." Thus the covenant can be made to
attach to and run with the estate of the grantee so as to
bind or benefit the subsequent assignee of this estate. But
what about the covenant on the part of the grantor? He
no longer holds an estate in the land which was the subjectmatter of the conveyance. The covenant on his part may
be in gross, or if the intention of the parties can be shown
it may be attached to other land which he then owns, and
thus run with such land so as to bind or benefit the subsequent assignee of such land.'
As to the third requirement that if the covenant relates
to something not in esse, then the assigns must be expressly
designated, a controversy has developed as to soundness
of this requirement. Some question has been raised
whether the English courts ever laid down this requirement,
or it was merely the personal idea of Lord Coke.' Several
jurisdictions have entirely repudiated this requirement. 10
619 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837) ; 68 P. 308 (Calif. 1902).
At least one jurisdiction has reached the conclusion that no privity of
estate is necessary between the covenantor and covenantee (grantor and
grantee), Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N. W. 874 (1874).
Under this view the only privity of estate necessary is that between the
covenantor and his assigns or that between the covenantee and his assigns.
'Ball v. Milliken, 31 R. I. 36, 76 At. 789 (1910).
Purvis v. Shuman, 273 IIl. 286, 112 N. E. 679 (1916).
10 Ibid.
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Probably the majority of jurisdictions today hold that the
assigns do not have to be expressly designated if the intention that the covenant should run with the land can be inferred from the language of the entire instrument.1 1
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the
Court found that the first mortgage, from the original mortgagors to the plaintiffs, created a privity of estate between
the original mortgagors and plaintiffs, such that covenants
inserted in the mortgage might attach to their respective
estates and run therewith. It is interesting to note that the
privity of estate, arising in the execution of a mortgage, is
not of the instantaneous type found in conveyances in fee,
but of a continuing nature similar to that existing between
landlord and tenant. A mortgage of fee simple property
has the effect of passing to the mortgagee the fee simple
title as security only, thus leaving in the mortgagor an
equitable estate described as the equity of redemption.
Thus as long as the equity of redemption remains unbarred
by foreclosure, a continuing privity of estate exists between
the mortgagor and mortgage. The burdens and benefits of
any covenants running with the land, found in the mortgage,
attach to these estates of the mortgagor and mortgagee so
as to run with such estates to their respective assigns. So
in this case the burden of this covenant to pay the taxes
when legally due attached to the equity of redemption and
ran with such equity of redemption until it was barred by
the foreclosure on February 16, 1935. Likewise the benefit
of this covenant attached to the plaintiffs' fee simple security title and would run with it to any assignee of the mortgage.
When in 1933 the defendant foreclosed its second mortgage and purchased this equity of redemption, it acquired
the equity of redemption subject to the burden of this covenant. Thus from 1933 until February 16, 1935, the defendant held the estate, i. e. the equity of redemption, to which
the burden of this covenant was attached, and therefore
became contractually liable for any breach occurring during
this period.
Defendant in its brief took the position that where a
covenant creates an affirmative burden rather than a restrictive one, the affirmative burden could not run with the
land except in cases of leases. It is true that the English
courts as well as one American state uphold the position
that affirmative burdens are in gross when created in a con11 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 840 (1859).
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veyance in fee rather than a lease.1 2 But the majority of
American jurisdictions have upheld the running of affirmative burdens as well as restrictive burdens whether found in
conveyances in fee or leases.'" Likewise it should be noted
that this covenant is found in a mortgage which is more
nearly similar to a lease than a conveyance in fee, since it
creates a continuing privity of estate rather than an instantaneous privity only.'
One of the principal points discussed by the Court in its
opinion was whether the burden of this covenant to pay
the taxes so touched and concerned the original mortgagors' equity of redemption, that it was capable of running
with this estate to the defendant. In this connection defendant contended that a distinction must be made between
the burden of a covenant to pay taxes by a lessee under a
lease, and a burden of a similar covenant by a mortgagor
under a mortgage on fee simple property. Why doesn't
the nonperformance of such a covenant affect the mortgagor's equity of redemption as much as the lessee's leasehold estate? In either case nonperformance may operate
to destroy the estates through a sale of the land to pay
delinquent taxes. A covenant is said to touch and concern
the land when "it tends directly or necessarily to enhance
its value or render it more beneficial and convenient to those
by whom it is owned or occupied."" Certainly any covenant, the nonperformance of which destroys the estates of
both the covenantor and the covenantee, touches and concerns the land, so that both the burden and benefit will run
with their respective estates. Waring v. National Saving
& Trust Co.'6 is definite authority for the Court's position
that the burden of a covenant to pay taxes in a mortgage
on fee simple property touches and concerns the equity
of redemption so that it can run with that estate.
The most bothersome problem in this case involves the
third requirement of covenants running with the land,
namely that if the covenant relates to something not in
esse, it will not run unless the assigns are expressly designated. Here the covenant relates to taxes which were not
in esse when the mortgage was executed. The taxes for
"2Miller

v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913).
Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F. (2d) 908 (1925).
See 41 A. L. R. 1363 for a list
of cases.
1, However, Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. R. Co., 253 N. Y. 190, 170
N. E. 887 (1930) refused to hold that an affirmative burden could run with
the mortgagor's estate when created In the mortgage.
"Hollander v. Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908).
138 Md. 367, 114 Atl. 56 (1921).
21
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1.934 and 1935 were clearly not in esse when this covenant
was executed. A careful inspection of the covenant discloses that in the covenanting clause, the assigns of the
mortgagor are not expressly designated. However, in the
clause giving the mortgagors the right to possession until
default upon payment of taxes, this right is expressly given
to the "assigns". Thus from the wording of the entire
instrument an intention to bind the mortgagors' assigns can
be inferred although the covenant proper does not bind the
assigns by express designation.
The opinion, without discussion of earlier Maryland decisions, finds that an intention to bind the assigns can be
inferred from the language of the entire instrument, thus
taking the view, supported by the weight of authority today, that the word "assigns" is not a technical word, necessary to the running of a covenant relating to something
not in esse. This conclusion is contrary to the position
taken in Maryland & Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Silver," where
it was held that "his heirs and assigns" were technical
words of limitation and in cases of covenants relating to
something not in esse were absolutely necessary in the covenanting clause. The refusal of the court to follow this
strict interpretation of Spencer's case"5 is to be commended,
and places Maryland among those states taking a liberal
view of this discredited requirement of covenants running
with the land.
With reference to the first contention the Court reached
the conclusion that the verbal agreement was not supported
by any new consideration and therefore in no way operated
to change the legal rights and liabilities of the parties, and
at most merely operated as a voluntary postponement by
plaintiff of foreclosure. Even though the agreement had
no validity and effect as a contractual modification of the
original covenant in the first mortgage, yet it might operate
to estop the plaintiff from enforcing this covenant if pursuant to this verbal agreement defendant acted in reliance
thereon to its detriment. True, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be applied as a substitute for consideration, for
many decisions have repudiated the existence of a "promissory estoppel".9 Thus the existence of an estoppel cannot be used to validate the verbal agreement made between
' 110 Md. 510, 73 At.

297 (1909).
Supra note 4.
1 williston on Contracts, (Rev. Ed.) Sec. 139, note S.
The Restatement
of Contracts, Sec. 88, approves the application of "promissory estoppel" In
18
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plaintiff and defendant. But estoppel can be raised as a
basis of an abandonment of an existing contract right.20
The benefit of this covenant appearing in the first mortgage, rested in plaintiffs at the time of this verbal agreement. This benefit is a contract right capable of abandonment, and therefore if the defendant can show a change of
position or detriment suffered by reliance upon this verbal
agreement, it has raised an estoppel against the enforcement of this benefit. However, did the defendant suffer a
detriment or make a change of position in reliance on this
verbal agreement by retaining possession until February
16, 19357
In Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,21 the Court of
Appeals held that under our title theory of mortgages,
where the mortgage contains a provision reserving the
right of possession in the mortgagor until default, the privity of estate remains in the mortgagor until default, and
then on default immediately passes to the mortgagee although the latter has not entered into actual possession.
On the basis of this case defendant could have abandoned
possession of the premises in 1933 at the time of the default,
and successfully contended that its privity of estate had
automatically passed to the plaintiffs on default. Without
privity of estate remaining in the defendant there could be
no liability for future breaches of this covenant during
1.934 and 1935. Thus the defendant, by verbally agreeing
to remain in possession as mortgagor after default, and
thus in effect consenting to retain its privity of estate, did
act to its detriment and change its position so as to be entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of estoppel. Plaintiffs'
only basis of recovery for breach of this covenant during
1934 and 1935 is that there existed privity of estate in the
defendant. Thus if defendant could have automatically
transferred this privity of estate to plaintiffs by its default
in 1933, it changed its own position by consenting to retain
possession in the capacity of mortgagor and thus retaining
the privity of estate which is the essential basis for liability
under this covenant during 1934 and 1935.
It is therefore submitted that the Court might have upheld defendant's first contention that this verbal agreement estopped the plaintiffs from enforcing the covenant
after the default in 1933. In this connection it must be
noted that during 1934 the defendant had a sufficient sur10 Williston

on Contracts, (Rev. Ed.) Sec. 139, note 13.

21 167 Md. 499, 175 At. 331 (1934).
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plus of income over disbursements to have paid that year's
taxes, and therefore has failed to comply with the express
provisions of this verbal agreement. Instead defendant
used this surplus to reimburse itself for loss arising in the
operation of the premises before this verbal agreement was
entered into. However, as for the taxes for 1935 no surplus of income over disbursements existed during the
month and a half of the year of 1935 that defendant
retained possession, so any liability for nonpayment of
that year's taxes must be predicated upon the covenant
in the first mortgage.
Having reached the conclusion that the burden of this
covenant did run with the equity of redemption to the defendant, so as to render it liable for breach of the covenant
by nonpayment of the taxes for the years of 1934 and 1935,
there remained the final problem of whether plaintiffs'
cause of action was enforcible in equity. The defendant's
estate in the property terminated on February 16, 1935,
thereby terminating its privity of estate with plaintiffs,
and terminating any liability for breaches subsequent to
that date. However, as to its liability for breaches occurring before February 16, 1935, this was not affected by the
termination of this privity of estate. Yet, as plaintiffs had
not instituted suit upon these breaches while the privity
of estate continued to exist, the Court, following the decision of Donelson v. Polk," held that plaintiffs had lost their
remedy at law and must maintain their suit in equity.
This position rests upon the mistaken view that privity
of estate is a necessary element to an action at law against
an assignee of the covenantor. Privity of estate is necessary at the time of the breach, so as to attach the covenant
to the land and thus render the assignee, who holds the
privity of the estate at the time of the breach, liable; but
when the breach has occurred, a cause of action exists between the parties then holding the benefit and burden.
Such a cause of action is personal between the parties, and
is entirely divorced from the land. Subsequent transfers
of the burdened estate or of the benefitted estate in no way
affect this cause of action. In other words, privity of estate must exist at the time of the breach, but is not essential
at the time of the suit. Here defendant held the burdened
estate at the time of the breaches, thus creating a personal
cause of action for damages vested in plaintiffs against
defendant. The fact that defendant's estate and privity
" 64 Md. 501, 2 At. 824 (1886).
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of estate terminated on February 16, 1935 should be immaterial to the maintenance of this cause of action.
It is unfortunate that our Court of Appeals has blindly
followed its early decision in Hintze v. Thomas23 upon this
point, since the decision in that case was based upon dictum
in the early English case of Fogg v. Dobie 4 Now, the
interesting feature of this dictum is the fact that it is contrary to the explicit decision, after full argument, in the
earlier English case of Harley v. King. 5 At the present
time Maryland is the sole jurisdiction which still follows
this mistaken dictum of this early English case.26 Our
Court of Appeals could do much in clarifying the doctrine
of privity of estate, if it would recognize its mistake, and
expressly hold that privity of estate is only essential at the
time of the breach as a means of fixing the contractual liability upon the assignee, but that once such liability arises
the continuance of such privity of estate is nonessential to
the maintenance of an action at law upon this personal
cause of action.
JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT-RECOVERY FOR PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF AN
ENTIRE CONTRACT AFTER BREACHBRIGHT V. GANAS'
Plaintiff-appellee served deceased for four or five years
under an oral contract whereby deceased agreed to leave
him $20,000. On the death of the employer plaintiff-appellee filed suit against the executor, the defendant-appellant, declaring on the oral contract in a special count and
also on the common counts. The evidence showed that deceased had repeatedly stated that he was going to leave
plaintiff-appellee $20,000, that he had paid him no regular
wages during his lifetime, and that while the master was
dying plaintiff made improper advances to the master's
wife. The lower court directed a verdict for defendant
on the special count, and the jury found for the plaintiff
on the common counts in the sum of $8,990. Defendantappellant appealed. Held, Reversed without new trial.
7 Md. 346 (1855).
2, 3 Younge C. Ch. 96, 160 Eng. Rep. 629 (1838).
25 2 Cromp. M. & R. 18, 150 Eng. Rep. 8 (1835).
26 See for a full discussion Tiffany's Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 158 (dd),
particularly note 480 for a discussion of the Maryland decisions.
23

" 189 At. 427 (Md. 1937).

